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RECIEN't DEVELOPfVHENTS

Jones v. State:
ITIS WITHIN
THE TRIAL
JUDGE'S
DISCRETION TO
DETERMINE
WHICH CRIME
OF VIOLENCE
CONSTITUTES
THE THIRD
CONVICTION FOR
THE PURPOSE
OF IMPOSING
AN ENHANCED
SENTENCE UNDER
ARTICLE 27, §
643B(C).

In Jones v. State, 336
Md. 255,647 A.2d 1204(1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it is within the
sound discretion ofthe sentencing judge to select which of a
defendant's convictions will
serve as the third crime ofviolence for the purpose of imp osing a mandatory enhanced sentence under article 27, section
643B(c) ofthe Annotated Code
of Maryland. In so ruling, the
court concluded that a defendant is not entitled to have a
section 643B(c) penalty imposed
upon the conviction that will
result in the mildest aggregate
sentence.
In the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, a jury convicted Duane Thomas Jones of
second degree rape, second degree sexual offense, and robbery. All three convictions arose
from the same incident which
occurred on March 15, 1991.
Jones had previously served a
term in a correctional institution
following convictions for two
separate crimes of violence.
Under article 27, section
643B(c) ofthe Annotated Code
of Maryland, a person who has
been convicted oftwo crimes of
violence arising from separate
incidents and has served a term
in a correctional institution as a
result of a conviction of a crime
ofviolence shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for at least twenty-five years upon being convicted of a third crime of violence. For the purpose of imposing the section 643B(c) penalty upon Jones, the trial judge
selected the robbery conviction

as the third offense. Jones did
not contest that he satisfied the
requirements for a section
643B(c) penalty. However,
Jones did contend that section
643B(c) is ambiguous, and
therefore, pursuant to the rule
oflenity, must be construed so
as to require that the section
643B(c) penalty be imposed on
the conviction that would result
in the mildest sentence.
Without the section
643B(c) penalty, the maximum
sentence Jones would have received is fifty years-- ten years
for robbery, and twenty years
each for second degree rape and
second degree sexual offense,
the terms to run consecutively.
Pursuant to section 643B(c) the
trial judge imposed the penalty
upon the robbery conviction,
and Jones' maximum sentence
was sixty-five years. In contrast, had the second degree
rape or second degree sexual
offense served as the third conviction, the maximum sentence
to which Jones would have been
exposed was fifty-five years.
The trial court rejected Jones'
contention that the robbery conviction should not serve as the
third crime ofviolence and Jones
appealed. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld the
sentence imposed by the trial
court. The court of special appeals held that selecting the
crime ofviolence upon which to
impose the section 643B(c) penalty is within the discretion of
the trial judge. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to consider Jones' con-
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tentions.
In reaching its decision,
the court of appeals looked at
the plain meaning of section
643B(c) and considered the legislative intent behind its enactment. The court began its analysis by noting that if statutory
language is ambiguous, the rule
of lenity requires the court to
construe the statute in favor of
the defendant. In rejecting
Jones' contention that section
643B(c) is ambiguous, the court
of appeals determined that because the language of section
643B(c) is clear, the rule of
lenity is not applicable and the
statute should be applied as
written. Jones at 261, 647 A.2d
at 1208. The court reasoned
that the plain language of section 643B(c) provides that a
third conviction of a crime of
violence mandates imprisonment for no less than twentyfive years. Because Jones' robbery conviction qualified as a
third conviction for a crime of
violence, the judge had authority under section 643B(c) to
impose the mandatory penalty
upon that conviction. Id. at 263,
647 A.2d 1208.
The court further explained that to apply a lesser
sentence when Jones had committed the second degree rape
and second degree sexual offense, yet impose a greater sentence had he not, would be inconsistent with the purpose of
the statute. Id. According to the
court, the Legislature's intent in
promulgating statutes such as
section 643B(c) was to protect
society by imposing enhanced

sentences upon recidivist criminals who fail to refrain from
criminal activity despite previous convictions and imprisonment. Id. at 264, 647 A.2d at
1208. The court explained that
the statute is devoid of any languagethat suggests a legislative
intent to prevent judges from
selecting the conviction with the
least severe penalty, thereby imposing the longest sentence. The
court reasoned that the legislature intended that the sentencingjudge have discretion, based
upon the nature of the convictions and the criminal history of
the defendant, to decide which
crime would best serve as the
third conviction. Id. at 264-65,
647 A.2d at 1209. The court
further supported its holding by
emphasizing the broad discretion that Maryland grants, in
general, to trial court judges in
sentencing criminal defendants.
Id. at 265, 647 A.2d at 1209.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bell, with whom
Judge Eldridge joined, rejected
the majority's construction of
section 643B(c). The dissent
maintained that the language of
section 643B(c) is ambiguous
and the legislative intent unclear
and, therefore, the statute should
be construed according to the
rule of lenity. Id. at 266, 647
A.2d at 1209. Reviewing the
language of section 643B(c),
the dissent reasoned that had
the legislature intended for a
judge to have such broad discretion in determining the offense to serve as the third crime
of violence, it could easily have
provided so more clearly in the

statute.ld. at 272, 647 A.2d at
1212. Rejecting the majority's
reasoning that its holding is firmly based in the plain meaning of
the statute, the dissent maintained that section 643B(c) fails
to address the situation in which
there is more than one crime
that could serve as the third
conviction. Id. at 269, 647 A.2d
at 1212. The dissent asserted
that section 643B(c) does not
indicate whether the enhanced
sentence should be applied to
the conviction with the greatest
maximum sentence or to the
one with the most lenient sentence.
In Jones v. State, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that it is within the discretion of the sentencing judge to
select which one of a defendant's convictions arising from
a single incident will serve as the
third crime of violence for the
purpose of section 643B(c). By
rejecting the argument that a
defendant is entitled to have a
section 643B(c) penalty imposed
upon the conviction that will
result in the least severe sentence, the court construed section 643B(c) against recidivist
criminals. While the opinion is
limited in that imposition of the
enhanced sentence remains
within the discretion of the trial
judge, the Jones decision represents the court's increasing concern in protecting society by
sentencing those who refuse to
refrain from criminal activity to
longer terms of imprisonment.
- Dana G. Vogts

